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Introduction
The work of Gérard Genette in the field referred to as “narratology”2 represents one 
of the most important contributions to narrative theory, considered as a branch of 
literary theory, in the second half of the twentieth century. I purposely say “one of 
the most important”, as there are other theoretical contributions, some of which I 
believe to be equally important though they are not as well known as Genette’s 
narratology, particularly in France.3 These lesser-known theories are rich in epis-
temological reflection. In this article, I shall set out to compare different narrative 
theories by examining their epistemologies. 
1 For the title as well as the subject of two of the three sections of this article, I am indebted to 
Marc Dominicy’s article on Jakobson’s poetics (see Dominicy 1991). I hope he will take this as the 
tribute it is rather than as a flat emulation. The connection between Ann Banfield’s narrative theory 
which constitutes one of the objects of this article and Jakobson’s poetics is not fortuitous. Ann 
Banfield can be considered as the last representative of a formalist approach to literature, indexed 
to fictional narrative rather than to poetry (see McHale 1983, 39 and Banfield 1992, 358).
2 See Todorov 1969, 10: “[T]his work draws on a science that does not yet exist, let us say, 
narratology, the science of narrative” (my translation).
3 To give an example, Ann Banfield’s name does not appear in the articles “Narration”, “Récit 
(théories du)” and “Théories de la narration”, in the Dictionnaire du littéraire, recently published by 
PUF (see Aron et al. 2002, 391–393, 498–500, and 597–598). It is much better known amongst the 
Anglo-Saxons and is almost always associated with a theory of free indirect style in fictional narrative 
rather than with a general theory of fictional narrative. On this point, the Routledge Encyclopedia of 
Narrative Theory, which has just come out, constitutes an exception. One should note, nevertheless, 
that the term “no-narrator theory” used by this encyclopedia (see Herman, Jahn and Ryan 2005, 
396–397 and passim) does not derive from Ann Banfield, but from the volume’s editors. Personally, 
I shall use the term “narratology” to indicate a particular type of narrative theory rather than to 
indicate narrative theory in general. This article will not cover the aspects of narrative theory related 
to structures of content (functions, sequences, etc.) in oral and written narratives.
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What are these theories and how do they differ? I would say that their difference 
essentially resides in their way of viewing the function of language used in narration. 
On the one hand, there is a narrative theory based, more or less explicitly, on a lin-
guistic theory which considers communication as the constitutive and ever present 
function of language: this is narratology, with its concepts of the narrator and the 
“narratee”, which are homologous to the speaker and the addressee of a situation 
of communication. In contrast to this theory of narrative communication are those 
which posit the fictional narrative, or a certain type of fictional narrative, and commu-
nication as mutually exclusive categories. According to these theories, the fictional 
narrative is not or at least not always an act of communication. It is seen as the ex-
pression of another function of language. Taking the cue from Shigeyuki Kuroda, I 
shall refer to these narrative theories as “non-communicational” (see Kuroda 1976).5
I have organized my argument into three parts. The first examines the construction 
of the object in narrative theory and the problems arising when a theoretical object 
(in this case, the narrative), defined by a certain number of properties, is confronted 
with empirical or historical data (in this case, narratives, or more precisely, two 
types of narratives traditionally called “first person” and “third person” narratives). 
The second part is concerned with the question of “falsification”, in a Popperian 
conception of science or scientific theory (see Popper 1977). I will examine 
Genette’s assertion that “all narrative is, explicitly or not ‘in the first person’, since 
its narrator can at any moment identify himself by the pronoun I” in light of Ann 
Banfield’s theory of narrative and free indirect style. Finally, in the third section, I 
shall discuss the reductionism of narrative theory, or, in other words, the thesis of the 
reduction of narrative theory to linguistics, considered as a more general science. 
These three parts correspond to a “series of recurrent debates in epistemology”6. 
The question of the fictive narrator in fictional narrative is what connects them.
The Object of Narrative Theory
I will begin here with a quotation taken from Gérard Genette’s preface to The Logic 
of Literature by Käte Hamburger, which appeared in French in 1986:
 I will focus essentially on the founding work of narratology, Narrative Discourse (1972, Engl. 
transl. 1980), on Narrative Discourse Revisited (1983, Engl. transl. 1988), which sums up ten years 
of research in narratology, as well as on other books and articles by Genette. I will also take into 
account René Rivara’s attempt in La Langue du récit: Introduction à la narratologie énonciative 
(2000), to provide narratology with a linguistic foundation by drawing from the work of Antoine Culioli. 
On the “narratee”, see Genette 1980, 259–262; 1988, 130–134 and Prince 1973 (Rivara, however, 
does not use this notion).
5 Among the proponents of non-communicational narrative theories are Émile Benveniste, in his 
article from 1959, Käte Hamburger, author of The Logic of Literature (1957, Engl. transl. 1973 and 
1993), Shigeyuki Kuroda and Ann Banfield, both linguists trained in Noam Chomsky’s generative 
grammar. For a presentation of the debate on communicational and non-communicational narrative 
theories, see Galbraith 1995.
6 See Dominicy 1991, 153 (my translation).
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 […] one cannot simultaneously study fictional narrative as narrative and as fiction, they 
remain disconnected: the “as narrative” of narratology implies by definition that one 
pretends to accept (the fiction of) the existence, prior to the telling, of a story to be told; 
by contrast, the “as fiction” of Käte Hamburger implies the refusal of this methodological 
hypothesis (or fiction) – and by the same token the notion of narrative itself, since there 
can be no narrative without a story; for which reason a fictional narrative is nothing 
more than a narrative fiction (Genette 1993b, xv–xvi).
With its lexical repetitions and ambiguous use of the term “fiction”, this quotation 
clearly illustrates the difficulties encountered by narratology’s construction of the 
object-narrative. We might wonder, for example, about this “one” who pretends to 
accept the existence of a story anterior to the narrative or independent of it: who is 
this “one” and what is his justification? The quotation also reveals Genette’s refusal, 
under the guise of dividing up the task, of any other theorization of the fictional 
narrative as such.7
To understand fully what Genette means by “story”, “narrative” and, in the end, 
 “fiction”, it is best to return to the founding work of narratology, Narrative Discourse, 
published in 1972 (Engl. transl. 1980). In the introduction of this work, after having 
gone over the different meanings of the word “narrative” in its common usage and 
that used by narrative analysts and theoreticians, Genette suggests using the word 
 “story” for the “signified or narrative content”, using the word “narrative” for the 
 “signifier8, statement, discourse or narrative text itself” – the term “narrating” des-
ignating “the producing of narrative action and by extension, the whole of the real 
or fictional situation in which that action takes place” (Genette 1980, 27). He then 
assigns to the analysis of narrative discourse the task of studying the “relationships 
between narrative and story, between narrative and narrating, and (to the extent 
that they are inscribed in the narrative discourse) between story and narrating” (ibid., 
29). At this stage, one can already formulate an explicit and rigorous definition of 
what narrative is to narratology. The narrative can be defined by two necessary 
properties, which are:
 
1. The property of telling a story (in other words a succession of causally linked events) 
 “without which it would not be narrative (like, let us say, Spinoza’s Ethics)”, writes 
Genette (ibid., 29).
2. That of being told by someone (who we could call a “narrator”) “without which (like, 
for example, a collection of archeological documents) it would not in itself be a 
discourse” (ibid.). 
These two properties allow us to distinguish the object-narrative from other types 
of discourse (for example Spinoza’s argumentative discourse) and from other 
7 And this is explicitly what Käte Hamburger’s Logic of Literature is driving at with the notion of 
 “epic fiction” (see Hamburger 1993, 59–194 and passim).
8 Taken from the linguist Saussure, the terms “signifier” and “signified” are synonymous here with 
 “form” and “content” or the “manifestation plan” as opposed to “content plan”. They are not used by 
Genette 1988.
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ways of telling a story9 (the second example of archeological documents is, in this 
sense, much less telling10). I would like to point out that this definition of narrative 
as narrative discourse is implicitly accepted by René Rivara, who writes in the first 
chapter of La Langue du récit:
We only have access to the narrative (to the text), which alone informs us both of the 
story (the narrated content) and of the narrating (the act of creating the narrative), or at 
least of the pertinent aspects of the narration, which are detectable thanks to the linguis-
tic and narratological traces it leaves in the text […] (Rivara 2000, 19, my translation).
However, if we follow Genette’s formulation (and hence also Rivara’s), it remains 
unclear whether it concerns narrative in a general sense or specifically fictional 
narrative. This leads us to make the hypothesis that in addition to the properties of 
(1) telling a story and (2) being told by a narrator, the fictional narrative possesses 
a specific property which enables us to distinguish it from the narrative of real facts, 
historical or autobiographical (or “factual” narrative in Genette’s terminology, see 
Genette 1993a, 55 ff.11). It is not easy to identify passages in Genette’s work which 
explicitly describe this third property – I will simply mention this passage in Fiction 
and diction (Genette 1993a, 70): the “rigorous identification [of the author and the 
narrator], insofar as it can be established, defines factual narratives – in which, 
in Searle’s terms (see Searle 1979)12, the author assumes full responsibility for 
the assertions of his narrative”, “[c]onversely, their dissociation […] defines fiction”. 
It nevertheless seems to me that the repeated assertion of the narrator’s fictive 
nature in fictional narratives, in both Narrative Discourse (Genette 1980, 214, 259) 
and Narrative Discourse Revisited (Genette 1988, 101, 139, 140, 141), fulfils the 
exact same function and I would not hesitate to define the third property as:
3. the property of having a fictive narrator.
When reading the works of Genette and other narratologists such as René Rivara, 
one rapidly notices the importance of this property in justifying narratology’s 
methods and categories. It allows narratology to examine the fictional narrative “as 
narrative” and not “as fiction”, in other words according to the same narratological 
and pragmatic modalities as factual narratives. I would like to insist on the fact that 
this is a construct. It is in no way obvious that a fictional narrative, which tells a fictive 
9 On the difference between “telling a story” and “being a narration”, in the sense of being told 
by a narrator, see Schaeffer 1999, 302 ff. (in this chapter, Jean-Marie Schaeffer argues against the 
systematic use of the notion of narrator in film). Also see the former article by Michel Mathieu-Colas 
1986, specifically pp. 94–96.
10 From a theoretical point of view, it is interesting to see Genette implicitly recognize the existence 
of texts outside of the communicational framework. On this type of text, see Philippe 2002.
11 Other theoreticians, such as Dorrit Cohn, prefer that of the “referential narrative”, which gains 
meaning within their own theoretical system (see Cohn 1999, specifically 9–17 and 109–131).
12 In this article, Searle defines fiction’s assertions as being feigned assertions. 
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story, is conceived as being told by a fictive narrator, telling a story made up of what 
he sees as real facts. Rivara considers that the distinction between real author and 
fictive narrator as well as between serious assertions and pseudo-assertions is an 
intuitively correct description of what happens in fictional narratives. It nevertheless 
needs to be supplemented by a precise linguistic analysis of the operation which 
establishes a fictive utterer-narrator and a fictive situation of utterance. Such an 
analysis would draw on the notion of “fictive locating” as developed by Antoine 
Culioli (see Rivara 2000, 300–307).13
The question remains whether the conception of the narrative according to 
Genette’s narratology and Rivara’s enunciative narratology can be successfully 
applied to all cases of narratives inherited from the past. It is important to remember 
that historically (see Fusillo 1991) the novel has offered examples not only of one, 
but two types of narratives, traditionally called “first person” and “third person” nar-
ratives.1 In the first case, the narrator who designates himself by saying “I” is given 
as a character of the fiction (for example des Grieux telling his story to “l’homme 
de qualité”, or Félix de Vandenesse, introduced by Balzac as “a character who 
recounts the story in his stead” [Balzac 1978, 915, my translation], or the Proustian 
narrator). He is clearly fictive and his action of narrating is equally fictive. In the 
case of third person narratives, not only is the narrator not a character but his very 
existence generally goes unnoticed. It is obvious that the qualification of “fictive” 
applied to the narrator does not have the same meaning in both cases. To put it a 
bit bluntly: it either refers to the author’s creation, or to a creation or elaboration of 
the theory.15
Before continuing, I will briefly examine how Käte Hamburger constructs the 
object-narrative in The Logic of Literature. Firstly, one notices that no particular 
property defines the fictional narrative and the factual narrative as belonging to the 
13 We encounter the notion of “fictive locating” in the description given by Culioli of how hypotheti-
cal propositions function (e.g., “I would have left if he hadn’t called me”), the use in French of “bien” 
with the conditional (e.g., “Je boirais bien un verre de bière”, Engl. transl. “I’d like to drink a glass of 
beer”), as well as the case of games (e.g., “You are the robber, I’m the policeman”). “Fictive” means 
 “an utterance in relation to a imaginary subjective location, unconnected to the current subject and 
enabling a complex representation: “‘<r> is the case’ is not necessarily the case’”, in which <r> 
symbolizes the predicative relation, for example “He called me” (Culioli 1999a, 160, my translation). 
1 I am well aware that these expressions are unsatisfactory, principally because of the mislead-
ing symmetry they establish between the two types of narrative. The “first person” narrative is a 
narrative in which the narrator designates himself by using the first person pronoun. The “third 
person” narrative is not a narrative in which the narrator designates himself by using a third person 
pronoun (which would correspond, if we are to stretch a bit, to the case of the “third person autobio-
graphy”, see Lejeune 1980, 32–58), but a narrative which only contains third person forms. Genette’s 
polemical rejection of the notion of the third person narrative will be examined in the second part of 
this article.
15 This confusion between literary and heuristic or methodological fiction is made apparent in the 
quotation of Genette’s preface to Hamburger 1986 (see above). Rivara seems to take more episte-
mological precautions when he writes: “Although the word ‘fictive’ is defined here in technical terms, 
in the framework of a specific linguistic theory, we have reason to think that this type of locating 
plays a predominant role in the enunciative analysis of ‘fictive’ narratives (in the usual sense of the 
term)” (Rivara 2000, 297, my translation). But as the reason is not given, we come up with about the 
same results. 
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same category. The specificity of the fictional narrative is posited from the outset in 
terms that discredit narratology’s proposals: 
 […] epic fiction, the product of narration, is not an object with respect to the narrative act. 
Its fictivity, that is, its non-reality, signifies that it does not exist independently of the act 
of narration, but rather that it only is by virtue of its being narrated, i.e., by virtue of its 
being a produce of the narrative act (Hamburger 1993, 136). 
Narration is defined as a function or as a sum of introduction techniques (combining the 
narrative, properly speaking, the dialogue and the monologue, the free indirect style, 
etc.), that produces the fiction. It is fundamentally different from the utterance to which 
the historical narrative and “natural” narration belong (see Hamburger 1993, 68–71).
It should be specified that in Käte Hamburger’s theory, the prototypical narrative 
is the third person narrative, traditionally referred to as omniscient. What Hamburger 
says is that the supposed dissociation between the author and the narrator in this 
type of narrative could be more aptly described as the absence of a narrator. The 
author is not a narrator: he does not “recount” in the usual sense; he uses the 
narrative function to constitute a fictive world, with fictive characters and events 
(his role is closer to that of a film maker than to that of an historian). Nor does he 
delegate the narrative to a fictive representative. Käte Hamburger’s definition has 
the merit of clearing away the epistemological haze that surrounds the notion of the 
fictive narrator: “[…] only in cases where the narrative poet actually does ‘create’ 
a narrator, namely the first-person narrator of the first-person narrative, can one 
speak of the latter as a (fictive) narrator” (ibid., 140). In her description of the first 
person narrative, we find all the properties of the fictional narrative in general as 
defined by narratology.
 
Falsification
All narrative theory which aims to be considered as scientific theory must contain a 
certain number of hypotheses that can be submitted to falsification. To tie this into 
the first part of my article, I should say firstly that it seems to me that the hypothesis 
of the fictive narrator in Genette’s narratology and Rivara’s enunciative narratology 
is not falsifiable. Indeed, one can interpret any aspect – whether it be the system 
of tenses in the narrative or the double play of recounting in a constative mode a 
partially or totally imagined story – as justifying the hypothesis of the fictive narrator. 
Narratology’s capacity for interpretation sometimes seems unlimited to me.16 This 
does not mean that there are not, in its corpus, falsifiable hypotheses or hypotheses 
16 So it seems in this passage of Genette 1988, 101: “Even the first sentence of The Killers (the 
knee-jerk representation of “objective” narrative) – The door of Henry’s lunch room opened – pre-
supposes a narrator capable, among other things, of accepting the fictive familiarity of “Henry”, the 
existence of the lunchroom, and the singleness of its door and thus, as it has so well be put, of 
entering into the fiction”. 
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that possess a high degree of falsifiability. This is the case of Genette’s assertion: 
 “In my view every narrative is, explicitly or not, ‘in the first person’ since at any 
moment its narrator may use that pronoun to designate himself” (Genette 1988, 97).
Here I have quoted from Narrative Discourse Revisited, but this assertion was 
already made, in a slightly different form (using “virtually” instead of “explicitly or not” 
and with the cause formulated less clearly in linguistic terms), in the first Narrative 
Discourse (see Genette 1980, 2).17 Moreover, in both cases it plays the same 
role, which is to confirm the need for a new typology of narratives, in terms of 
narrative relationship, “homodiegetic” or “heterodiegetic”18, rather than in terms of 
person. In Rivara we find the same argument pointing to the possibility of a narrator 
designating himself as “I” in a third person narrative (or an “anonymous” narrative 
in his own terminology, see Rivara 2000, 22 ff.).19 In both Genette and Rivara, the 
anonymous or heterodiegetic narrator is thus the speaker of a narrative that is not 
in the first person (and who can, like any speaker, designate himself as “I”), just 
the same as the “I” is the speaker of a first person narrative. This hypothesis is 
testable, falsifiable and has been falsified, as we are going to see, by the work of 
Ann Banfield. However, the narratologists did not take into account this falsification 
and made the theory unfalsifiable. 
Contrary to what one often hears, Banfield’s argument does not solely depend 
on the existence of free indirect style in the novel as, on the one hand, there are 
other definitions of free indirect style20 and on the other, free indirect style, as she 
defines it, only makes up one of these “unspeakable sentences” of which she tries 
to theorize. 
Banfield’s starting point, since her article in 1973, establishes a comparison 
between direct and indirect speech and a list of elements and constructions limited 
to either of these two modes of reported speech (the inversion of the subject in 
questions, exclamations, repetitions and hesitations, “incomplete” sentences, etc., 
in direct speech; the subordination of a verb of communication in indirect speech). 
In order to take into account the elements and constructions linked to direct speech 
and which are impossible to subordinate, Banfield suggests modifying the base 
postulate of generative grammar according to which each sentence consists of 
a nominal group followed by a verbal group (symbolically: S → NP + VP). She 
introduces an initial symbol which dominates S, noted as E (for “expression”), and 
17 The English translation does not contain “virtually”.
18 These terms indicate, respectively, the presence or absence of the narrator as a character in the 
story he tells (see Genette 1980, 245 ff. and 1988, 97–98).
19 More precisely, he uses Danon-Boileau’s (1982) terminology. Contrary to Genette, Rivara does 
not put the distinction between first person and third person narratives into question.
20 See, for example, Fludernik 1993, who insists on what she calls “non-standard” forms of free 
indirect style (which are not in the third person, which are not in the past and which appear in 
corpora other than the modern novel) and on the existence of oral free indirect speech. In France, 
the term “free indirect speech” is often assigned to a certain type of polyphony (or the use of the 
 “words of others”, see Authier 1978), which is neither direct nor indirect speech. Also see the debate 
on the question of whether free indirect style can be defined in strict linguistic terms or not. 
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of which the sentence NP + VP is only one of many possibilities amongst other 
 “sentences” or other elements non-derivable from sentences.21 What differentiates 
E and S is that E is not a recursive element (in other words, it does not have 
capacity to reappear an indefinite number of times in the same derivation): this is 
what explains that the elements and constructions dominated by E and different 
from S cannot be used in a subordinate sentence, most notably in the subordinate 
sentence of indirect speech. Let us take, for example, this “sentence” from Mrs 
Dalloway reported in direct speech: “In love!” she said (Woolf 1992, 9). It is an 
incomplete sentence, immediately dominated by E, which cannot be subordinated, 
and therefore reported as: *She said that in love. The symbol E is associated with 
a general interpretive principle which Banfield formulates as follows: “For every 
expression (E), there is a unique referent of I (the SPEAKER), to whom all the 
expressive elements are attributed, and a unique referent of you (the ADRESSEE 
or LISTENER)” (Banfield 1982, 57). In the example of Mrs Dalloway, Clarissa is the 
speaker and Peter Walsh her listener.
Free indirect style, which Banfield considers to be a characteristic technique of 
writing, neither complies with the syntax of direct speech nor with that of indirect 
speech and cannot be derived from underlying structures of both modes of reported 
speech. It seems evident that sentences of free indirect style are dominated by 
E and not by S. They possess all of its syntactical properties, in particular that 
of never being subordinate. Like sentences reported in direct speech, they can 
contain subject inversions in the interrogative form, exclamations, repetitions and 
hesitations, incomplete sentences, etc. We can see this at work in the following 
example, taken again from Virginia Woolf’s novel: He was in love! Not with her! With 
some younger woman, of course! (Woolf 1992, 9). In sentences such as these, 
the previously established relationship between the first person and the subjective 
expression no longer holds. We therefore need to reformulate the principle “1 E / 1 
SPEAKER”, by dividing it into two basic principles:
<1 E / 1 SELF>: For every node E, there is at most one referent, called the “subject of 
consciousness” or SELF, to whom all expressive elements are attributed. That is, all 
realizations of SELF in E are coreferential.
<Priority of SPEAKER>: if there is an I, I is coreferential with the SELF. In the absence 
of an I, a third person pronoun may be interpreted as SELF (Banfield 1982, 93).
Following this principle of the speaker’s priority, the presence of a speaker who 
designate himself as “I” necessarily implies the presence of a subject of conscious-
ness co-referent to the “I”; yet in other sentences of free indirect style, those with a 
subject of consciousness designated as “he” or “she”, the first person is ruled out 
(as is the second person, which characterizes the situations of communication). 
21 Initially listed by Quang Phuc Dong 1969 (Engl. transl. 1971): for example, “Shit on the flag”, 
 “Hurrah for her”, etc. See also Milner 1978, 226–245, on the isolated use of “qualitative nouns”.
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This can be verified by a simple test. In this sentence by Flaubert, for example: 
Qu’importe! elle n’était pas heureuse, ne l’avait jamais été (What does it matter! 
She wasn’t happy and never had been [Flaubert 1951, 550, my translation]), the 
exclamation is attributed to “she”, which refers to Emma Bovary. But if we add an 
 “I”, which would read something like: Qu’importe! elle n’était pas heureuse, ne l’avait 
jamais été, à mon avis (What does it matter! She wasn’t happy and never had 
been, to my mind), the exclamation must be attributed no longer to Emma, but to 
the referent of the first person pronoun; there is no longer any trace of a subject of 
consciousness designated by using a third person pronoun. “Since no first person 
may appear in represented speech and thought except one interpretable as the 
E’s SELF […], this means that represented Es cannot be simultaneously attributed 
to a covert or “effaced” narrator” (Banfied 1982, 97). In other words, free indirect 
style as defined by Banfield presents a singular case of observation which falsifies 
narratology and Genette’s hypothesis. 
For Banfield, free indirect style signifies the withdrawal of the author as utterer 
(and all the more so of the narrator considered as the author’s creation): it is the 
author who withdraws from the narrative while effacing all traces of his utterance22. 
In the study of the context in which free indirect style occurs, Banfield draws on 
Benveniste’s analysis of utterance which he calls “historical” (and which Banfield 
suggests renaming “narrative” or more precisely “narration”): “there is […] no 
longer even a narrator23. The events are set forth chronologically, as they occurred. 
No one speaks here; the events seem to narrate themselves. The fundamental 
tense is the aorist, which is the tense of the event outside the person of a narrator” 
(Benveniste 1971, 208). What remains is the objective function of the sentences, 
without a speaking subject or traces of subjectivity.2
Genette’s presentation of Banfield’s narrative theory in Narrative Discourse 
Revisited reads like something of a caricature. Here is a passage from his con- 
clusion:
Narrative without a narrator, the utterance without an uttering, seem to me pure illusion 
and, as such, “unfalsifiable”. Who has ever refuted the existence of an illusion? I can 
therefore set against its devotees only this regretful confession: “Your narrative without 
a narrator may perhaps exist, but for the forty-seven years during which I have been 
reading narratives, I have never met one”. Regretful is, moreover, a term of pure polite-
ness, for if I were to meet such a narrative, I would flee as quickly as my legs could 
carry me: when I open a book, whether it is a narrative or not, I do so to have the author 
speak to me. And since I am not yet deaf or dumb, sometimes I even happen to answer 
it (Genette 1988, 101–102).
22 See again Philippe 2002 for the description of the “formal device” of the effacing utterance.
23 I must specify that the word “narrator” here designates the author as narrator, i.e. that he recounts 
a narrative, and not the narrator of narratology whose conception was subsequent.
2 Which does not preclude there being, in “historical” or “narrative” texts, interventions of the 
author or a narrator created by the author in the “discourse” mode. For a description of utterance 
discontinuity in the narrative, see Kuroda 1976, 240 and Galbraith 1995, specifically 46–48.
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This “realistic” judgement, in Bachelard’s sense25, does little to advance the theory. 
Moreover it is inexact to say that the hypothesis of an utterance without an utterer 
in free indirect style is not falsifiable. To refute Banfield’s hypothesis, one would 
need to prove not only that the intervention of a narrator who designates himself as 
 “I” is possible in the free indirect style sentences of a particular narrative26, but also 
that such an intervention is systematically possible in the language and therefore 
capable of being formalized in the grammar of this language.
Reductionism of Narrative Theory
This third and last part of my article concerns the question of identifying those 
elements which, in the literary text, and particularly in the narrative text, belong to 
language, as the object of formal linguistics, and those belonging to the narrative 
alone (even if it is made of linguistic matter). I will now set aside the Genettian nar-
ratology which never showed much interest in the “language of the narrative” (I will 
add that this is the title of Rivara’s work, see also Rivara 2000, 12 and passim27) 
and turn my attention to Rivara’s enunciative narratology and Banfield’s theory of 
narrative and free indirect style.
The reductionist character of Rivara’s enunciative narratology first appears in 
the assertion that “narrating, the activity of producing narratives, is nothing more 
than a particular type of utterance characterized by a specific situation of utterance” 
(Rivara 2000, 21, my translation), and in the two formulated theses: (a) “With the 
exception of time, [...] the categories of narratology (mode, voice, point of view) can 
only be defined subsequent to a purely linguistic analysis of the utterance” and 
(b) “[t]he failures and shortcomings of contemporary narratology, the confusion 
surrounding the term ‘focalization’, the fruitless efforts to establish even a rudimen-
tary typology for narratives are due solely to the absence of enunciative linguistics 
indispensable to the study of literary narratives” (ibid., 22, my translation). This is 
reasserted several times, for example in the chapter entitled “The utterance of the 
narrative”, which contains a new revision of Benveniste’s opposition of “history” 
and “discourse”28: “If one were to take very literally Benveniste’s assertion that ‘no 
25 “Listen to the realist argue: he immediately has an advantage over his adversary, because he 
believes he alone possesses the real, the richness of the real, while his adversary is caught up 
in illusions. In its naive form, in its emotional form, the realist’s certitude proceeds from a miserly 
bliss” (Bachelard 1993, 158, my translation). The “psychoanalysis of the realist” takes part in the 
denunciation of epistemological obstacles. 
26 See, for example, McHale 1983, especially 37–38 (quoted as a post-scriptum addition in 
Genette’s bibliography 1988, 169). I am well aware of the innumerable discussions sparked by the 
publication in English of Banfield’s work; as interesting as some of them are, I consider that none 
can claim to have successfully falsified the main hypothesis of the theory.
27 One must not confuse this appeal to linguistics and its concepts and methods with what Genette 
himself (1980, 30) calls “linguistic metaphor”, which presides over the choice of the terms “time”, 
 “mode” and  “voice” to indicate the categories of narratology.
28 The first attempt of this sort can be attributed to Genette 1966 (Engl. transl. 1982, 138–143); 
also see Genette 1988, 99 (quoted by Rivara 2000, 50).
Patron 
128
one speaks’ in a narrative or historical text, one would come to the conclusion that 
enunciative linguistics is incapable of shedding light on this kind of text” (ibid., 16). 
There is little need to stress the limitations of this reasoning, but I would like to 
point out that there are other definitions of the utterance which, not being founded 
on the couple utterer-situation of utterance, enable an analysis of “historical” or 
“narrative” texts from the standpoint of enunciative linguistics.29 Yet what is even 
more important to point out, at least from my own epistemological perspective, is 
that the program of Rivara’s enunciative narratology is based on a series of poorly 
justified reductions (such as his reducing fiction to “fictive locating”) and that he 
allows clear contradictions to surface:
Apart from very rare cases […], the anonymous narrator does not have the power to 
designate or describe himself as a person. Conversely, he is invested, as we have said, 
with powers which the speaker does not possess (unless we want to turn linguistics 
into a study of superhuman language) (Rivara 2000, 307, my translation).
We cannot maintain throughout a work of three hundred pages that the author and 
the narrator of the narrative are identifiable as, respectively, the “speaker” and the 
 “fictive utterer” of Culioli’s theory, and in the end be led to believe that the narrator 
of third person narratives is not an utterer – for we do not know what a “purely 
superhuman” language might be. This conception is not scientific and does not 
lend itself to investigation of this kind.30
Banfield is also reductionist though she never uses the term: “There can […] 
be no formal literary theory that is not in some sense a linguistic theory” (Banfield 
1983, 230). Yet unlike Rivara, she systematically explains and makes explicit the 
steps leading to this reductionist position (see Banfield 1982, 1–21 and Banfield 
1983).
Above all, Banfield highlights the important distinction between “competence” 
and “performance” in linguistic theory (see Chomsky 1965, 3–15)31, and asks the 
following question: Is it possible to conceive a model of literary competence dis-
tinguished from the performance that texts are? The idea of literary competence 
should not be surprising; by literary competence we simply mean the capacity 
of certain utterers to produce literary texts identifiable as such, and that of other 
utterers to understand and interpret these texts.32 Banfield, however, considers this 
29 See Ducrot 1984, 179: “What I am indicating by this term [‘uttering’, in French énonciation] is 
the event by which an utterance appears […] I am not saying that the uttering is the act of someone 
producing an utterance: to my mind, it is simply the fact that an utterance appears […]” (quoted by 
Philippe 2002, 26, my translation).
30 On the notion of the omniscient narrator, see Kuroda 1979, 256.
31 Competence is defined as “the speaker-hearer’s knowledge of his language”; the performance as 
 “the actual use of language in concrete situations” (ibid., ). This distinction makes a non-functional, 
formal linguistic theory possible. 
32 This aspect of literary competence can be simulated by computer. See the work of the Cognitive 
Science Research Group of the University of New York at Buffalo in Duchan et al. 1995.
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conception of literary competence too vague. Most factors on which the creation 
and comprehension or interpretation of texts depend are erratic by nature and 
therefore escape attempts to formalize them. “What is required is an idealization 
of the text that – if inspired by linguistic analogy – is as adapted to the particular 
qualities of the literary as was Chomsky’s idealization from the utterance to the 
sentence” (Banfield 1983, 203). To Banfield’s mind, the style (or what she also 
calls the “language of narration” or the “language of fiction”) provides the type 
of idealization sought after, the style being, like the sentence, a notion that the 
utterers intuitively possess and a notion that can be given a definition or precise 
description in literary theory. On the other hand, everything not considered style 
is seen as performance; this is where disciplines such as literary history, criticism 
in all its forms, and even stylistics in its current incarnation regain their status. 
Banfield concentrates on the study of free indirect style, a sub-category of style (or 
 “represented speech and thought” in her own terminology33). As we have seen in 
the second part of this article, the study of free indirect style defined as represented 
speech and thought clearly favors non-communicational narrative theory, which 
identifies the narrative’s sentences as either having a subject utterer or not, over 
communicational theory and in particular narratology. 
We have also seen that the behavior of elements and constructions characteristic 
of free indirect style can be expressed by means of the symbol E, which allows to 
take into account the relation of implication between a subject and the expression 
of a subjectivity: “1 E / 1 ‘I’ ” in sentences of ordinary speech, for example in a 
sentence reported by using direct speech; “1 E / 1 SELF” in free indirect style 
sentences without an “I”. The E symbol or entity is an integral part of the ontology 
of Banfield’s theory (and that of Jean-Claude Milner in his De la syntaxe à 
l’interprétation). For both, the entity E exists as an element of linguistic reality. Yet 
this conception is far from being unanimously accepted by linguists. Some, as is 
the case with Antoine Culioli, see the symbol E as a pure theoretical artifact (see 
Culioli 1999, 59–61).3 Others, such as Nicolas Ruwet, in his debate with Jean-
Claude Milner, argue against using the E symbol and against the idea of its being 
made the initial symbol of grammar.35 This being the case, we can at least say that 
Banfield’s reductionist assertion – according to which the behavior of elements and 
constructions characteristic of free indirect style are part of the language and can 
33 Adapted from Jespersen’s terminology 1965 (1924). See Banfield 1978a and b, and 1982, n. 14, 
277–278. Until recently, the English language did not have a widely recognized term to refer to this 
style. The most currently used term, “free indirect discourse,” was adapted from the French.
3 It should be pointed out that Culioli’s critique concerns Banfield 1973 alone.
35 Among these arguments are those concerned with syntax (“The expansion of E according to 
Banfield is a syntactic holdall”, Ruwet 1982, 298) and others dealing with the association of the 
syntactical particularities of E, in particular that of never being subordinated, and of the interpreta-
tion principle reformulated by Milner, according to which the E necessarily expresses an emotion of 
the utterer (ibid., 299 and 314). In conclusion, Ruwet suggests returning to a derivational approach 
of the “expressions” question.
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be formalized in the grammar of this language – is inseparable from the elaboration 
of “another grammar”36, which is to say, another conception of language.37
Ending on this point, I will add that Banfield’s theory, as a scientific theory, is 
undeniably superior to other narrative theories and in particular narratology38, due 
simply to the fact that it explains more things than narratology does. It alone offers 
an explanation for the role of writing, as opposed to the oral, in the production and, 
as it happens, in the reception of narratives. In Banfield’s theory, it is by writing, in 
the sense of written composition and not of transcription of the oral, that a form 
such as free indirect style can be realized in the performance. This ties into the as-
sessment already made by certain linguists (see, among others, Benveniste 1971; 
Simonin-Grumbach 1975) and corroborated by certain writers and critics39, that 
writing is the extra-linguistic factor that enables the author to withdraw from being 
the utterer of the narrative.
Conclusion
We must rework or at least put into perspective our models for analyzing fictional 
narratives. As Bachelard wrote: “Through usage, ideas unduly gain value. A value 
in and of itself is opposed to the free movement of values. This is a factor of mental 
inertia” (Bachelard 1993, 17, my translation). The idea that all narratives have a 
fictive narrator who can, at any moment, identify himself as “I”, is an adamantly 
upheld “value” in narratology. In this sense, it is opposed to the rectification of 
errors and, in the end, to the very movement of ideas. Moreover, by renouncing the 
hypothesis of there being a narrator in all narratives, we are better able, I believe, 
to advance our understanding of the reader’s cognitive activity concerning the 
fictional narrative.0
36 Milner (1978, 334) implicitly recognizes this difference when he speaks about “a grammar that 
uses Banfield’s concept of E” (my translation).
37 I should specify that these remarks do not invalidate the falsifying impact of Banfield’s argument, 
as presented in the second part of this article.
38 For a critique of oral interaction considered as a model or as a mode of communication by 
default, see Fludernik 1993, 58–65. See also her critique of the voice metaphor in Fludernik 2001, 
619 ff.
39 One thinks, of course, of Maurice Blanchot’s reflections: see Blanchot 1982, specifically 26–28, 
and 1993. See also Banfield 1985 and 1998, two articles devoted wholly and in part to the work of 
Blanchot.
0 I would like to take for proof Schaeffer’s difficulties reconciling narratology and cognitive 
psychology’s contribution to understanding fiction (see Schaeffer 1999, specifically 255–256 and 
269–270). For a more developed theory of the cognitive processes associated with reading fiction, 
see Duchan et al. 1995 (this work is not mentioned in Schaeffer’s bibliography).
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